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We propose an ethical intervention with the potential to reduce unethical decision-making.
We challenge the relationship between moral disengagement and unethical decision-making.
We use attachment theory as the basis for the ethical intervention.
Individuals primed with attachment anxiety experience the usual effects of moral disengagement.
However, individuals primed with attachment security are able to withstand moral disengagement.

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 24 July 2012
Revised 1 November 2013
Available online 19 November 2013
Keywords:
Moral disengagement
Attachment theory
Ethics
Morality
Ethical intervention

a b s t r a c t
We propose an ethical intervention leading to improved ethical decision-making. Moral disengagement has long
been related to unethical decision-making. We test an ethical intervention in which this relationship is broken.
Our ethical intervention consisted of priming individuals to be securely-attached, in which they recalled a past instance of relational support and acceptance. We predicted and found an interaction between attachment state and
moral disengagement, in which individuals primed with attachment security were able to withstand moral disengagement. In Study 1, we demonstrate that the securely attached behave more ethically than the anxiously attached
in an achievement context. In Study 2, we show that secure attachment overrides one's natural propensity to morally disengage. In Study 3, we ﬁnd that secure attachment minimizes the impact of the propensity to morally disengage through the mechanism of threat construal. Within both student and working adult samples and using both
judgment and behavioral dependent variables, we show that the priming of secure attachment is a relatively simple
and effective intervention that managers, educators, and organizations can use to reduce unethical behavior.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

“Nothing good ever happens after moral disengagement.”— The
psychologist's amendment to Mama's old saying about nothing good
ever happening after midnight.

Introduction
While Albert Bandura (1986) never actually said those words, he did
ﬁrst put forth the notion of moral disengagement and perhaps, the
subsequent literature on moral disengagement is captured in that hypothetical quotation. Moral disengagement enables ordinary people to do
unethical things, free from the stomach-churning and self-ﬂagellation
☆ The authors thank Steve Blader, Joseph Garcia, David Mayer, and Julia Turret for their
assistance, as well as Shelly Gable and two anonymous reviewers. The ﬁrst two authors
contributed equally to this work; ﬁrst authorship was determined by a coin toss.
⁎ Corresponding author. Fax: +82 42 350 4340.
E-mail address: sujinlee@kaist.ac.kr (S. Lee).
0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.11.005

that such behavior usually evokes (Bandura, 1990). Much like the
hours after midnight, the mind after moral disengagement seems to
welcome transgressions, both the everyday and trivial sort as well
as the cruel and egregious (ranging from taking home ofﬁce supplies to
perpetuating genocide: Bandura, 1999; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara,
& Pastorelli, 1996; Fiske, 2004; Moore, 2007; Moore, Detert, Treviño,
Baker, & Mayer, 2012; Ntayi, Eyaa, & Ngoma, 2010). The current paper investigates a condition under which this seemingly tight linkage between
moral disengagement and ethical transgressions might not hold. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize and test an ethical intervention based on attachment theory that enables individuals to withstand moral disengagement.

Moral disengagement
Moral disengagement is a psychological process by which individuals
engage in sanctionable behavior without distress or self-condemnation
(Bandura, 1990). More speciﬁcally, moral disengagement refers to a set
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of eight cognitive mechanisms which serve to disinhibit an individual's
unethical behavior (Bandura, 1986): moral justiﬁcation, euphemistic
labeling, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, disregarding or distorting the consequences, dehumanization, and attribution of blame. When an individual morally
disengages from an action through any of these (interrelated) mechanisms, the action becomes morally palatable and thus, the individual is
able to engage in unethical behavior without the self-censure such an
act would normally provoke (Bandura, 1999). The trait-based tendency
to use these cognitive mechanisms varies by individual and can be
measured (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008); this individual difference
is also sometimes referred to as the propensity to morally disengage
(Moore et al., 2012).1
Moral disengagement is often discussed in the context of war, genocide, and terrorism, and has been shown to lead to greater aggression
(Bandura et al., 1996), more deviant behavior (Ntayi et al., 2010),
more violent behavior (Bandura, 1999), and less humane conduct
(Fiske, 2004). Moral disengagement also plays a critical role in the processes of organizational corruption (Moore, 2007). Moore et al. (2012)
demonstrate that the propensity for moral disengagement predicts a
broad range of work-related behaviors above and beyond individual
difference constructs commonly associated with unethical behavior
(e.g. Machiavellianism, moral identity, cognitive moral development),
such as self-reported unethical behavior, decisions to commit fraud,
self-serving decisions in the workplace, and co-worker and supervisorreported unethical work behaviors. Similarly, Detert et al. (2008) ﬁnd
that moral disengagement explains variance in unethical decision making beyond that explained by empathy, moral identity, trait cynicism,
and chance locus of control orientation. Bandura (1990, p. 43) articulated
the importance of moral disengagement to more “ordinary” ethical behavior early on: “Such mechanisms operate in everyday situations in
which decent people routinely perform activities having injurious
human effects, to further their own interests or for proﬁt.” This paper investigates this relationship between moral disengagement and ethical
behavior, leveraging the learnings of attachment theory to diminish the
impact of moral disengagement.

Attachment theory
In its original form, attachment theory (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters,
& Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1982) captured the idea that early closerelationships experienced by children shape the psychological template
for the relationships that the child will eventually form as an adult.
Attachment orientations are characterized as secure (anticipating that
one's needs will be met), anxious (uncertain if one's needs will be
met), avoidant (withdrawing so that the dependence on others for
meeting needs is less), or fearful (combining both avoidant and anxious
orientations) (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991).
Although attachment was traditionally treated as a dispositional
construct, the current literature conceptualizes and empirically
tests both the trait-based and the state-like aspects of attachment
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). Different attachment-related feelings can
be made salient due to situational triggers, and thus, temporary attachment states can be dynamically aroused (Lee & Thompson, 2011). Both
in trait and state forms, attachment predicts a wide range of relational
and emotional outcomes (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), as well as
work-related, organizational outcomes (Lee & Ling, 2007). Within
the work domain, attachment theory has been extended to non-close
relationships (Lee & Thompson, 2011).

1
Readers should note that some earlier work, such as Detert et al. (2008), uses the term
“moral disengagement” to refer to what Moore et al. (2012) deﬁne as propensity for moral
disengagement. Our work here refers to the individual difference measure.
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Attachment, ethics, and threat construal
Attachment orientation has been linked to ethical beliefs and behavior (Albert & Horowitz, 2009; Ennis, Vrij, & Chance, 2008; Gillath, Sesko,
Shaver, & Chun, 2010; Van Ijzendoorn & Zwart-Woudstra, 1995). For
example, attachment security generated the most ethical beliefs in a
consumer context (Albert & Horowitz, 2009) and attachment security
enhanced authenticity and honesty in relational contexts (Gillath
et al., 2010). In this paper, we explore why the anxiously attached behave less honestly than the securely attached, focusing on the achievement context as our setting. We propose that part of the explanation
can be found in how secure versus anxious attachment affects a wide
variety of psychological processes, including how people construe the
achievement setting.
The construal of an achievement setting is surprisingly relevant
to attachment theory. In fact, one of the more pernicious features
of attachment anxiety is its tendency to not only affect how an individual views a particular relationship but also to more broadly shape
the individual's construal of his or her circumstances, even those unrelated to the particular relationship. Elliot and Reis (2003) describe
how attachment anxiety leads individuals to “imbue achievement
settings with diverse personal meanings” (p. 327). One implication
of this tendency is that the securely attached view achievement
situations as challenges while the insecurely attached view the
same situations as threats and as evaluative of their competence
(Elliot & Reis, 2003).
This “threat construal” is a perception that the situation holds potential for harm or loss (Lazarus, 1991; McGregor & Elliot, 2002). Threat
construal has been shown to mediate the relationship between attachment anxiety and achievement motivation; speciﬁcally, anxiouslyattached individuals were more likely to construe situations as threats,
and subsequently, to be motivated to avoid doing poorly (as opposed
to motivated to perform well) (Elliot & Reis, 2003, Study 4). Construing
a situation as a threat has a profound effect on subsequent behavior, and
we will propose that the relationship between anxious attachment and
threat construal has important ethical implications.
Bowlby, 1982 originally described the attachment system as a system that is activated by environmental threats that endanger an
individual's survival, thus creating a need for protection from other people and proximity-seeking behavior. As Mikulincer and Shaver (2003)
describe, “In (Bowlby's) view, a combination of attachment-unrelated
sources of threat and lack of access to an attachment ﬁgure compounds
distress and triggers the highest level of attachment-level activation”
(p. 60). In other words, lack of secure attachment is a threat in and of
itself, and secure attachment is also a response to other threats. Attachment security is the condition of being protected from threat and the
condition of perceiving fewer threats while attachment anxiety leaves
individuals exposed to more threats and perceiving more threats.
We propose that it is this condition that leaves the anxiously-attached
individual ethically vulnerable.
We argue that the tendency for the anxiously attached to feel
more threatened relates to their tendency to be less ethical, and
the feeling of threat experienced by the anxiously attached is the
mechanism behind their moral lapse. We expect that priming attachment anxiety leads individuals to view situations as threats, and subsequently, to behave more unethically. In three studies, we investigate
this relationship. First, we hypothesize that, consistent with previous
studies, priming attachment security will generate more ethical
behavior than priming attachment anxiety in an achievement context (Study 1). Second, we hypothesize that secure attachment
overrides one's natural propensity to morally disengage (Study 2).
Finally, we hypothesize that secure attachment will minimize the
impact of the propensity to morally disengage, by reducing the construal
of the achievement situation as a threat (Study 3). We conclude by
discussing the opportunities that this mechanism offers in the form of
ethical interventions.
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Study 1
Method
Participants and design
Fifty-six people were recruited through a national on-line subject pool
via Qualtrics in the United States and were paid for their participation.
Eighteen percent of the sample was male; the mean age was 21.8
(S.D. = 2.15). Twenty-seven percent had completed high school, 70%
had completed at least some college, and 3% had an advanced degree.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the secure or anxious
attachment conditions.

of this effect. If the effect only appeared in relational contexts, this
would suggest that the mechanism might not be cognitive. But when
the effects of attachment, a presumably relational construct, appear in
a non-relational, achievement context, then we are led to consider
mechanisms that are related to how such situations are construed as
well. Ultimately, in this paper, we will test the mechanism of this effect.
But, ﬁrst, we move to Study 2, which also takes place in an achievement
context, measuring propensity to morally disengage and testing secure
attachment as an ethical intervention.
Study 2
Method

Procedure
Participants read a paragraph priming attachment state (e.g., Baldwin,
Keelan, Fehr, har Enns, & Koh Rangarajoo, 1996; Mikulincer, Gillath, &
Shaver, 2002) which began “People interact with others every day.
Think about a time in which you interacted with someone.” Then, in the
secure condition, they read:
In particular, recall a situation in which you were secure and comfortable
depending on this person and having this person depend on you. You
didn't worry about this person getting too close to you. You found it easy
to get close to this person and having him or her depend on you. You felt
very accepted and supported.
In the anxious condition, they read:
In particular, recall a situation in which you were anxious because you
found this person was reluctant to get as close as you would like and to
depend on you. You wanted to know this person more, but you somehow
felt that he or she didn't want it. You were unsure whether he or she liked
you. You often worried that he or she didn't really accept you.
Participants were then told to “take a moment to refresh your memory and think about your experience in this type of interpersonal situation. It might be helpful to close your eyes and visualize this particular
situation.” They then wrote when this happened, and described their
key thoughts and feelings in that particular situation.
Afterwards, they read the following scenario about an achievement
context:
You are preparing your resume to submit to a company you are interested
in working for. The job description states that there is a minimum GPA
requirement of 3.7. The company did not request a transcript. You have
a 3.6 GPA.
Participants were then asked how likely they were to put a 3.7 GPA
on their resume using a scale ranging from 0 (very unlikely) to 7 (very
likely). Finally, demographic measures were collected.

Participants and design
One hundred one students at a Northeastern U.S. university participated to fulﬁll a course research requirement. Forty-three percent
were male, and the average age was 20.93 (S.D. = 3.09). Forty-two percent reported being American, 17% were Chinese, 4% were from the
Dominican Republic, and the remaining 37% reﬂected nationalities
represented by fewer than 3%. Participants were randomly assigned to
either an attachment security or anxiety condition.
Procedure
Attachment was primed as in Study 1. Participants then completed a
24-item measure of moral disengagement (alpha = .85) (Detert et al.,
2008) adapted from Bandura et al. (1996), and Bandura, Barbaranelli,
Caprara, and Pastorelli (2001). Responses to the items were recorded
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree).
The participants were then given the following scenario:
Imagine that you are participating in an experiment where you can
earn between $7 and $21 and the compensation is based on your
performance. Based on your performance on the task in the experiment,
your compensation works out to be $7. When you complete the
experiment, you follow the instructions in which you are to open
an envelope of cash containing a total of $25 and withdraw your
compensation from a stack of $1 and $5 bills. The experimenter is not
in the room and you have been told not to write your name or any
identifying information on any of the materials. There is no chance of
being caught if you take more than $7 from the envelope.
Participants circled how much they would take out of the envelope
in one dollar increments ranging from $7 to $25. This response served
as our dependent measure, willingness to steal. Again, this context
was selected as an achievement context, allowing us to examine the
effects of attachment security in a non-relational context in which
individual performance is being assessed. Finally, they completed a
demographic questionnaire.

Results and discussion
Results and discussion
Men were more willing to lie about their GPA than women (r = .29,
p b .01) and so we included gender as a control measure. As hypothesized, participants primed with attachment security were less willing
to lie about their GPA (M = 3.50, S.D. = 2.35) than those primed
with attachment anxiety (M = 4.13, S.D. = 2.36), F(1, 55) = 4.15,
p b .05, partial η2 = .07.
Study 1 replicates previous research (Gillath et al., 2010) by showing
that state-like attachment security generates more ethical decisionmaking in an achievement context (e.g., GPA). It is important that we
highlight the critically important contribution of Study 1 in uncovering
the mechanism, and thus to our paper and to the literature. In this study,
we replicate an important ﬁnding in a conceptually distinctive context
that has critical theoretical implications. The achievement context is
particularly useful as it provides insight into the potential mechanisms

Gender was correlated with moral disengagement (r = − .30,
p b .01), such that men were higher on moral disengagement than
women; thus, as in Study 1, we retained gender as a control variable.
There was no main effect of attachment prime on moral disengagement, F b 1. However, there were two main effects of attachment
prime and moral disengagement on participants' willingness to
steal. That is, consistent with Gillath et al. (2010), participants
primed with attachment security were less willing to steal
(M = 8.08, S.D. = 3.68) than those primed with attachment anxiety
(M = 10.10, S.D. = 5.79), F(1, 96) = 4.21, p b .05. And replicating
previous research (Detert et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2012), the greater
the propensity to morally disengage, the more willing they were to
engage in stealing, F(1, 96) = 4.84, p = .03.
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More central to our hypothesis, these main effects were qualiﬁed
by the hypothesized interaction between attachment prime and moral
disengagement, F(1, 96) = 3.93, p = .05. Testing of the simple slopes
revealed a signiﬁcant simple slope for attachment anxiety, t = 2.20,
p = .03; whereas the simple slope for attachment security was nonsigniﬁcant, t b 1.
To summarize, moral disengagement led to unethical decisionmaking only under conditions of primed attachment anxiety. Under
conditions of primed attachment security, moral disengagement no
longer predicted unethical decision-making. The security-primed participants were resistant to unethical decisions, despite their propensity
for moral disengagement. Like Study 1, Study 2 takes place in an
achievement context. In Study 3, we use yet another achievement
context and test threat construal as a mechanism of this effect.
Study 3
Method
Participants and design
Three hundred and ﬁfteen individuals were recruited via Mturk to
participate for $1.00 plus a potential performance bonus of up to
$1.00. Fifty percent were male and the average age was 33 years
(S.D. = 11.57). All participants reported speaking English as a ﬁrst language. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions:
secure or anxious attachment.
Procedure
Participants were told that the study would take place in ﬁve parts.
In Part 1, they completed a 24-item measure of moral disengagement
(Detert et al., 2008). Responses to the items were recorded on a
5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). These items were found to be reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .88).
In Part 2, they completed a ﬁller task related to feature search where
they searched for letters or symbols in a matrix of information. In Part 3,
participants were primed with either secure or anxious attachment
using the same manipulation as in Studies 1 and 2. In Part 4, participants
completed two items reﬂecting threat construal and two items
reﬂecting challenge construal (Elliot & Reis, 2003; McGregor & Elliot,
2002). Challenge construal was measured with “I view this task as a
positive challenge” and “I think this task represents a positive challenge
to me.” Threat construal was measured with “I view this task as a threat”
and “I think this task represents a threat to me.” Participants responded
on 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 (very true of me) scales. Responses were
summed to form the challenge (Cronbach's alpha = .95) and threat
(Cronbach's alpha = .94) construal indices.
Finally, in Part 5, participants were introduced to a word scramble
task in which they were tasked with solving as many of the four provided word scrambles as they could in 2 min. Again, as in Studies 1 and 2,
an achievement context was selected, and in this case it serves as a behavioral dependent variable. Participants were instructed that they
could use scrap paper, but were told not to search the internet or refer
to any other resource or person for help of any kind. The word scrambles
were: RTEACLIS, FSNAITE, MRBTHUE, and RODCAEE. After the 2 min
were up or when the participant advanced the screen they were told
that for each scramble they solved correctly they would receive a
bonus of $.25. They were then asked to report their score from 0 to 4
scrambles correct. Two of these scrambles are unsolvable, and so to
operationalize stealing, we coded any score greater than 2 as unethical
behavior.
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η2 = .02) predicted stealing behavior. Those in the secure condition
(EMM = .12, SE = .04) stole signiﬁcantly less than those in the anxious
condition (EMM = .26, SE = .04). Gender was not related to stealing
(F = .03).
In addition, in a MANCOVA on challenge and threat construal controlling for gender, an effect of attachment on challenge and threat construal was found, F(2, 307) = 10.48, p b .001, partial η2 = .06. Those in
the secure attachment condition construed the task as a challenge
(EMM = 11.71, SE = .20) more than those in the anxious condition
(EMM = 10.95, SE = .20), F(1, 308) = 7.10, p b .01, partial η2 = .02.
And, those in the anxious attachment condition construed the task as
a threat (EMM = 4.47, SE = .20) more than those in the secure condition (EMM = 3.22, SE = .20), F(1, 308) = 20.30, p b .001, partial
η2 = .06. Gender was also related to challenge construal, as women
were more likely to construe the task as a challenge, F(2, 307) = 4.72,
p b .01, partial η2 = .03.
We next tested the hypothesized effect of secure attachment
diminishing the inﬂuence of the propensity to morally disengage. Stealing was regressed on attachment condition, moral disengagement, and
the interaction of attachment and moral disengagement in Step 1 in a
hierarchical ordinary least squares regression analysis. Both independent variables were centered (secure = − 1, anxious = 1) (Aiken &
West, 1991). Gender and challenge construal were entered as control
variables in Step 2 (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).2 The main
effect of attachment was qualiﬁed by the interaction of attachment condition and the propensity to morally disengage (see Fig. 1). Simple slope
analyses reveal the predicted effect of secure attachment, such that
there was no effect of one's propensity to morally disengage when
primed with a secure attachment, t = .03, p = .98. In contrast, when
primed with an anxious attachment, the more they were prone to
morally disengage, the more they stole, t = 2.69, p b .01. The propensity
to morally disengage, gender, and challenge construal were not
signiﬁcantly related to stealing.
We posited that this effect of attachment prime was the result of
how the achievement situation was construed as a threat. To test this,
we followed the steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) and
further speciﬁed by Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005). As described
above, there is an overall treatment effect of attachment on stealing,
thereby meeting the ﬁrst criterion (see Model 1 in Table 1). The second
criterion speciﬁes a treatment effect on the proposed mediator. Both attachment condition and moral disengagement predicted threat construal (see Model 2 in Table 1), such that anxiously attached and those
more prone to morally disengage perceived the task as more of a threat.
To assess the third and fourth criteria, threat construal was centered and
added to the hierarchical regression model (see Model 3 in Table 1). The
third criterion was met. Threat construal signiﬁcantly and positively
predicted stealing behavior, while controlling for attachment condition,
the propensity to morally disengage, and the interaction of attachment
and moral disengagement. Including threat construal increased
the variance explained signiﬁcantly from r2 = .05 to r2 = .06,
F(1, 304) = 5.30, p = .02. Finally, the fourth criterion was also met.
When controlling for the effect of threat construal, the effect of attachment decreased from B = .06, t = 2.00, p b .05 to B = .05, t = 1.60,
p = .11 and the interaction effect of attachment and moral disengagement also decreased from B = .13, t = 1.93, p = .05 to B = .11,
t = 1.74, p = .08. We also conducted a bootstrapping procedure to
construct bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals around the indirect effect
based on 1000 random samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The 95% conﬁdence interval excluded zero [.002, .058], indicating that threat construal mediated the relationship of attachment to stealing behavior.

Results and discussion
There was a main effect of attachment condition on stealing. In an
ANCOVA, controlling for gender to maintain consistency with earlier
studies, attachment condition (F(1, 311) = 5.74, p = .02, partial

2
We operationalized stealing in two ways: as a continuous variable reﬂecting the extent to which they stole (see Table 1) and as a dichotomous variable indicating whether
they stole. The results are consistent with each other. For parsimony, we present results
using the continuous variable only.
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Secure

Anxious

$1.00

Amount stolen

$0.80

$0.60

$0.40

$0.20

$0.00
Low MD

High MD

Moral disengagement
Fig. 1. Study 3.

Study 3 thus replicates the interaction effect between attachment
and moral disengagement that we found in Study 2; that is, attachment
security replicates as an effective ethical intervention. In Study 3, the
conceptual importance of threat construal to attachment theory becomes clear as threat construal serves as the mechanism underlying
this effect.
General discussion
The link between moral disengagement and unethical decisionmaking (Detert et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2012) is well-established.
We investigated an ethical intervention grounded in attachment theory
that breaks the link, allowing individuals to withstand their propensity
to morally disengage. One of the most inﬂuential theories in developmental and social psychology is attachment theory (Bowlby, 1982;
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) and the insights of attachment theory provide the foundation for the ethical intervention we demonstrate. We explain the tendency for the securely-attached to behave more ethically
than the anxiously-attached and ﬁnd that individuals primed with
attachment security are more able to ethically withstand the impact of
moral disengagement due to whether they perceive the task to be a
threat. These results suggest that an effective ethical intervention

heightens attachment security in the moment, perhaps as simply as
prompting the recall of a speciﬁc episode in which an individual felt
they could depend on someone else.
Attachment has surprising psychological reach. Not only do
stable orientations borne of childhood experiences matter, but so do
temporary states of momentary attachment feelings. Not only do close
relationships matter, but so do non-close relationships such as those
in the work domain. Not only are relationships affected, but so are
one's general perceptions of daily experience outside of those relationships. This span of antecedents and consequences positions attachment
as a critical construct in the study of human behavior generally, and
ethical decision making speciﬁcally. In this paper, we integrate two
previously disconnected consequences of attachment: 1) attachment
shapes ethical beliefs and behavior, and 2) attachment shapes one's
construal of situations as threats or challenges.
Our results have two important implications. First, our ﬁndings
suggest that even individuals predisposed to morally disengage are
not doomed to experience the morality-sinking effects of moral disengagement. Thus, we identify a boundary condition for moral disengagement's effects on ethics. And, second, the construal of situations
as threatening is a critically important mediator. Other situations, unrelated to attachment or moral disengagement, may lead to a similar construal, and thus, have a similarly troublesome effect on ethics. And,
other interventions, unrelated to attachment, may diminish the feeling
of threat, and thus, also be effective interventions.
For example, the relationship between secure attachment and gain
framing offers a rich area for potential study in the growing literature
of ethical interventions. The framing of a situation as a loss (instead of
a potential gain) leads to less ethical behavior (Kern & Chugh, 2009),
suggesting that gain framing is also an effective ethical intervention.
Perhaps the “ethical framing effect” is explained by a similar threat construal mechanism.
We note our work's limitations and opportunities for additional
research. A fruitful line of research might rest in ethical domains characterized by close relationships as our studies only focused on achievement contexts. Future research might also examine social exclusion
(which is closely related to attachment anxiety), which has been
shown to decrease prosocial behavior (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall,
Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2002). Finally, we do not measure attachment but rather, rely on the strength of the
manipulation. Thus, we do not know if individuals predisposed to anxious attachment orientation can be prevented from making unethical
decisions if their state-based attachment security is primed or if the
effects are stronger for those who experience congruence between
their attachment state and trait.

Table 1
Study 3: Stealing operationalized as a continuous measure.
Criterion variable
Predictor variable
Step 1
Constant
Attachment
MD
AttachmentXMD
Threat construal
Step 2
Gender
Challenge construal
F(df)
Adjusted R2

Stealing (Model 1)

Threat construal (Model 2)

Stealing (Model 3)

.18 (.03)⁎⁎⁎
.06 (.03)⁎
.11 (.07)+
.13 (.07)⁎

.02 (.14)
.62 (.14)⁎⁎⁎
.78 (.30)⁎⁎

.18 (.03)⁎⁎⁎
.05 (.03)
.10 (.07)
.12 (.06)+
.03 (.01)⁎⁎

.03 (.06)
−.01 (.01)
(5, 306) = 2.87⁎⁎

−.08 (.26)
−.40 (.05)⁎⁎⁎
(5, 305) = 19.40⁎⁎⁎
.23

.03

.11 (.30)

.03 (.06)
.02 (.01)
(6, 304) = 3.34⁎⁎
.04

Note. Values are unstandardized beta coefﬁcients and standard errors are presented within the parentheses. Attachment condition was coded −1 for secure and 1 for anxious.
MD = moral disengagement.
+
p b .10.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
⁎⁎⁎ p b .001.
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We see great potential for future research to explore how these
ﬁndings can have maximal practical beneﬁt through the development
of ﬁeld-based versions of the lab manipulations used to generate attachment security. Gillath, Selcuk, and Shaver (2008) summarize the manipulations found to be effective in both subliminal and supraliminal
forms, by exposing people to: security-related words (e.g. love,
support); names of security-providing attachment ﬁgures; and, pictures
representing attachment security. Additionally, they include: asking
participants to recall memories of being supported by attachment
ﬁgures (as in our studies), and asking people to imagine scenarios in
which they are supported by attachment ﬁgures. We wonder, for example, might photographs of loved ones on a desktop or as a computer
screensaver serve as a security prime in the workplace? What is the
impact on cheating of recalling one's security-providing attachment
ﬁgures before an exam within schools? What adaptations can be
made, as Lee and Thompson (2011) did in the context of negotiations,
to capture workplace situations in which individuals experience
security with a boss, a client, or an organization? The potential to
leverage the relatively simply ethical intervention of security priming
is signiﬁcant and ripe for further exploration.
Additional beneﬁts are likely to accompany such an intervention. For
example, security priming has been found to increase compassion and
prosocial behavior (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005). That said, additional research should explore whether security priming might have unintended
consequences as well, perhaps on individual's receptivity to extrinsic
motivators such as performance incentives, or on overall effort and persistence. Investigating these potential side effects will allow researchers
to more fully prescribe an effective ethical intervention.
Conclusion
We have drawn from the attachment and moral disengagement
literatures to posit that state-based attachment interacts with moral
disengagement in predicting ethics. The current paper contributes to
the theoretical understanding of unethical behavior, deepening our
knowledge of its basis and mitigating circumstances, and in the future,
we are hopeful that this understanding will grow in this line of research.
Our goal was to develop an ethical intervention that could diminish the
impact of moral disengagement on unethical decision-making. Feeling
supported and accepted by others would seem to be a reward in itself
while feeling unsure and worried about whether others like you
would seem to be sufﬁcient burden to bear. Yet, these feelings of secure
and anxious attachment generate rewards and burdens well beyond the
relational domain in which they originate.
The potential of an ethical intervention is much needed in today's
complex and at times, stunningly corrupt, society when moral disengagement sometimes seems to threaten our very essence of humanity.
As organizations, families, schools, and governments search for strategies to undo the ethical perils of moral disengagement amongst an undoubtedly multi-causal set of psychological, sociological, and economic
forces, we offer a relatively simple ethical intervention with tremendous
real world implications: secure attachment.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.11.005.
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